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they ration depositors with positive probability. If, on the other hand, banks
are not permitted to hold illiquid assets, then the optimal deposit contract tol-
erates runs that occur with small probability. For reasonable parameter values,
restricted banks overinvest in the liquid asset and they avoid non-run rationing
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Proposed Running Head: Narrow Banking
* We dedicate this paper to the memory of the late, great Bruce Smith, who was very supportive of this
project. We are grateful to Neil Wallace for extremely useful criticism of an earlier draft. We thank Huberto
Ennis and Todd Keister for stimulating discussions on alternative (rational) expectations possibilities in
modelling bank runs.1
1 Introduction
In this paper, we revisit the question of whether or not legal restrictions on bank portfolios
contribute to the stability of banks. In our model, the probability of a bank run is zero if bank
portfolios are unrestricted, but these banks will “run out” of cash and ration their depositors
with positive probability even though they are immune to runs. However, government policies
that restrict banks from holding illiquid assets cause banks to choose deposit contracts that
can tolerate runs with small probability.1 For reasonable parameters, the restricted banks
overinvest in the liquid asset and they avoid “running out” of cash (i.e. non-run rationing
of depositors).
Our model is built on the classic model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and its successors,
but there are some signiﬁcant diﬀerences:
(1) In Diamond and Dybvig, banks provide ins u r a n c ea g a i n s tt h ee v e n tt h a tac o n s u m e r
becomes impatient and must do her consumption “early” (if patient, she consumes “later”).
We follow Diamond and Dybvig in building our model upon the stochastic nature of some
urgent consumption opportunities2 or urgent needs, but we modify the model to capture
the transactions and payments roles played by checking accounts. For us, a depositor facing
a consumption opportunity is someone who requires immediate liquidity to make an im-
portant purchase or someone taking advantage of the convenience of writing a check. The
beneﬁts of a demand deposit account would be severely limited if 100% payment were not
made by the bank. Either the cash transaction could not be completed or the check would
bounce. The consumption opportunity would be lost or deferred. We attempt to capture the
1Diamond and Rajan (1998) develop a model in which the possibility of a bank run aﬀects bankers’
bargaining power in renegotiating loan contracts with borrowers. If a run occurs, depositors capture the
loans and renegotiate with borrowers directly. It is the threat of a run that disciplines bankers. In Diamond
and Rajan, a run cannot occur in equilibrium.
2For a general-equilibrium analysis of this type of intrinsic uncertainty, see Peck (1996). The interest in
impulse-demand extends well beyond ﬁnancial intermediation.2
payments role of banks by assuming that when the consumer ﬁnds a “consumption oppor-
tunity” it is of the nature of an indivisible good. We assume that impatient consumers ﬁnd
their best consumption opportunities in the ﬁrst period, while patient consumers ﬁnd their
best consumption opportunities in the second period. In another departure from Diamond
and Dybvig and as a proxy for more complete intertemporal analysis, we assume that all
consumers value “left-over” cash (beyond the demand for funds to ﬁnance these indivisible
consumption opportunities) in the ﬁnal period.3 Utility is assumed to be a strictly concave
function of the “left-over” consumption equivalent.
(2) We allow for intrinsic uncertainty: in particular, we allow the proportion of impatient
consumers to be random.4
(3) Following Cooper and Ross (1998) and Peck and Shell (2003), we allow for a pub-
licly observed extrinsic (sunspots) random variable on which depositors can coordinate their
actions. This allows bank runs to be tolerated with positive probability in the optimal
contract for the pre-deposit game. It seems to us that it is the combination of intrinsic
uncertainty (represented here by the proportion of consumers who are impatient) and ex-
trinsic or strategic, market uncertainty (represented here by “sunspots”) that is essential in
modeling ﬁnancial intermediation – especially if one is interested in the potential fragilities
due to banking and other intermediation.
(4) We assume that there are two assets: one based on a liquid, lower-return technology
and the other based on an illiquid, higher-return technology.5 We also allow for the possibility
that the government might restrict banks to holding only the liquid asset in their portfolios.
3Our motivation is somewhat diﬀerent than theirs, but Jacklin (1987) and Wallace (1996) allow utility to
depend in a general way on consumption in each period.
4See also Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Green and Lin (2003), and Wallace (1988, 1990).
5This two-technology approach was used by Wallace (1996). The restrictions on the bank in Wallace’s
formal models are diﬀerent from ours.3
(5) We follow Wallace and others in treating the bank’s deposit contract as a mechanism,
but we place some restrictions on this mechanism. While the bank must satisfy sequential
service, we do not allow the bank to punish customers who were denied service in period 1
or who refused service in period 1. We also assume the bank is not allowed to oﬀer pure
lotteries in its deposit contract. While our class of mechanisms is very broad and includes
the possibility of partial suspension of convertibility, the indivisible nature of consumption
opportunities6 implies that partial suspension will not be employed in the optimal contracts.
We analyze two ﬁnancial systems: (I) In the uniﬁed ﬁnancial system, the bank provides
payment services and invests in both types of assets. (II) In the separated7 ﬁnancial system,
the bank provides payment services but it invests only in the liquid asset. The separated
ﬁnancial system might emerge because of regulations which restrict bank investment to
relatively liquid assets or because the non-regulatory costs of ﬁnancial integration justify the
separated ﬁnancial system.
Our results can be summarized as follows. The uniﬁed bank’s optimal contract eliminates
runs8, but does allow for a positive probability of non-run rationing9 of impatient customers.
6Along with the assumption that there is a continuum of consumers.
7Our separated ﬁnancial system yields a bank that is close to what advocates of narrow banking recom-
mend, although Friedman would perhaps restrict banks from holding government bonds. See the introduction
to Wallace (1996). The diﬀerences are largely of interpretation. We are thinking that the separated bank
does not hold the most illiquid assets in its portfolio, while the narrow bank is restricted to holding only the
most liquid assets. Of course, with only two asset types, these ideas are the same. Nonetheless, advocates
of narrow banking might be startled at ﬁrst by our results.
8There is a run equilibrium at the so-called “optimal contract” in the uniﬁed system, based on the
traditional planner’s problem that selects the best (non-run) equilibrium. However, the run equilibrium can
be eliminated at negligible welfare cost. More importantly, in the uniﬁed system, a bank run equilibrium
cannot occur with positive probability at the fully optimal contract that takes into account depositors’
propensity to run.
9This type of rationing is socially desirable since otherwise there would be overinvestment in preparation
for the worst case outcome. Champ, Smith, and Williamson (1996) dub as “panics” large shocks that
necessitate rationing. Thus, the uniﬁed ﬁnancial system can avoid extrinsic panics of the self-fulﬁlling
Diamond-Dybvig variety, but it opens up the possibility of intrinsic “panics” and non-run rationing.4
This happens when the realized proportion of impatient customers is relatively large. For
the bank in the separated ﬁnancial system, the constrained eﬃcient contract allows for
runs occuring with small probabilities. Consumers are rational depositors in such banks.
Compared to the uniﬁed bank, the separated ﬁnancial system tends to heavily overinvest in
the liquid asset. For this reason, rationing by the restricted bank is impossible or extremely
unlikely.
The policy implications of this analysis might be surprising – at least to some of the
early proponents of narrow banking. If the government restricts banks to holding only the
liquid asset, then this restriction will make the ﬁnancial system more fragile by allowing for
a positive probability of bank runs.
2 The Model
There are three periods and a continuum of consumers (the potential bank depositors) rep-
resented by the unit interval. In period 0, each consumer is endowed with y units of the
consumption good. A fraction α of the consumers is impatient: each of these has a “con-
sumption opportunity” in period 1, yielding incremental utility of u for 1 unit of consumption
in period 1. If the consumption opportunity goes unfulﬁl l e di np e r i o d1 ,t h e s ec o n s u m e r s
face a diminished (or discounted) consumption opportunity in period 2, yielding incremental
utility of βu for 1 unit of consumption in period 2, where the scalar β is less than unity.
The remaining consumers are patient: each of these has a consumption opportunity, yield-
ing incremental utility of u for 1 unit of consumption in period 2.10 Beyond these urgent
“consumption opportunities,” both types of consumers derive utility from additional (“left-
over”) consumption in period 2, and can costlessly store consumption across periods. Thus,
10We could have argued that patient consumers would receive incremental utility of βu if they took
advantage of their consumption opportunity in period 1 instead of period 2. This would not aﬀect our
results.5
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i (for “cash”) is the total withdrawal of a type i consumer from the bank in period
t. I stands for impatient and P stands for patient. The positive scalar ¯ u is the utility from
the (indivisible) consumption opportunity. Speciﬁcation (1) is based on the assumption that
the consumers will always be able to aﬀord their consumption opportunities in period 2, and
that ¯ u is high enough so that it is optimal to undertake available consumption opportunities.
We assume that u is an increasing, smooth, and strictly concave function of “terminal” (or
“left-over”) consumption, so we have u0 > 0 and u00 < 0.
Let f denote the probability density function for α, the fraction of the consumers who
become impatient, which is assumed to be continuous and have support [0, ¯ α],w h e r e¯ α<1.
In keeping with our assumption that consumers are identical, ex ante, we have the following
process in mind.11 First, nature determines α according to f. Then, nature selects each
particular consumer to be impatient with probability α and patient with probability (1−α).




0 (1 − a)f(a)da
.
11The continuum model is convenient, but there are technical issues regarding the law of large numbers,
which we ignore. Our main results hold with a ﬁnite number of consumers, although the expressions and
calculations become more complicated.6
Ac o n s u m e r ’ st y p ei sh e rp r i v a t ei n f o r m a t i o n .
There are two constant-returns-to-scale technologies, an illiquid, higher-yield technology,
A, and a liquid, lower-yield technology, B. Investing 1 unit of period-0 consumption in
technology A yields RA units of consumption in period 2. Investing 1 unit of period-0
consumption in technology B yields RB units of consumption if held until period 2, or 1 unit
of consumption if harvested in period 1. We assume that 1 <R B <R A holds.
I np e r i o d0 ,t h eb a n kd e s i g n st h ed e m a n d - d e posit contract, or banking mechanism. We
assume that the bank seeks to maximize the ex-ante expected utility of consumers. Following
most of the literature, we focus for the moment on the post-deposit game, which starts after
the mechanism is announced and deposits are in place. The so-called “optimal contract”
solves the traditional planner’s problem, which imposes the incentive compatibility condition
that a patient consumer chooses period 2, given that all other patient consumers choose
period 2. We can then ask whether the “optimal contract” also admits a run equilibrium.
Of course, if the run equilibrium is expected, the contract would no longer be optimal,
and perhaps no one would be willing to deposit.12 In Section 5, with the help of extrinsic
uncertainty, we analyze equilibrium runs in the full (pre-deposit) game, where the optimal
contract takes into account depositors’ propensity to run.
The banking mechanism must respect the restrictions required by the timing of the post-
deposit game, described as follows. At the beginning of period 1, each consumer (now a
depositor) learns her type and decides whether to arrive at the bank in period 1 or period 2.
Consumers who choose period 1 are assumed to arrive in random order. Let zj denote the
12A consumer could invest her endowment herself, instead of dealing with the bank. It does not matter
whether or not we allow a consumer to access technology B privately, but we do require that unharvested
“trees” cannot be traded. This is to rule out the case in which a patient depositor (claiming to be impatient)
trades period-1 consumption withdrawn from the bank for unharvested trees. Jacklin (1987) has shown
that such a market undermines the optimal contract, and his argument applies to our setting as well. See
Haubrich (1988) for a more general analysis. Ruling out this asset market is merely to posit that only banks
can provide the liquidity necessary to pay for urgent consumption opportunities.7
position of consumer j in the queue. Because of the sequential service constraint, consump-
tion must be allocated to consumers as they arrive to the head of the queue, as a function
of the history of transactions up until that point. We further assume that consumer j’s
withdrawal can only be a function of her position, zj
13, and that she has an opportunity to
refuse to withdraw and return without prejudice in period 2. The bank cannot keep track
of how many consumers have refused.14 Let α1 denote the measure of consumers who have
made a withdrawal in period 1. In period 2, the bank chooses how to divide its remaining
resources between those who have withdrawn in period 1 and those who have not.15
A contract speciﬁes the fraction of a consumer’s endowment invested in technology B,
denoted by γ; her withdrawal in period 1 as a function of her arrival position, denoted by
c1(z); and her withdrawal in period 2 from technology B i n v e s t m e n t sa saf u n c t i o no fα1
and whether the consumer made a withdrawal in period 1 or not, denoted respectively by
c2
I(α1) and c2
P(α1).16 That is, a consumer who receives c2
I(α1) from technology B investments
receives a total withdrawal in period 2 of C2
I(α1)=c2
I(α1)+(1−γ)RAy. Similarly, a consumer
who receives c2
P(α1) from technology B investments receives a total withdrawal in period 2
of C2
P(α1)=c2
P(α1)+( 1− γ)RAy. We assume that parameters ares u c ht h a tn o n n e g a t i v i t y
13From a mechanism design standpoint, it might seem strange not to allow consumers to send messages
to the bank. This is almost without loss of generality, since consumers will send whatever message gives
them the most consumption. However, we are ruling out the bank oﬀering a lottery to learn a consumer’s
type, and punishing consumers in period 1 after a patient consumer has arrived. Besides being costly to
implement, these lotteries and punishments hardly correspond to accepted conservative banking practices.
14Thus, zj should really be interpreted as the measure of consumers who have already withdrawn from
the bank in period 1 before consumer j has an opportunity to withdraw. The purpose of this restriction is
to disallow the bank from telling a customer during a run that they may not withdraw in period 1 and that
they also forfeit their claims to consumption in period 2.
15In principle, what a consumer receives in period 2 could depend on how much she received in period 1,
and not just on whether she made a withdrawal. This distinction is not important here, since the optimal
contract always provides 1 unit of consumption in period 1 until the bank runs out.
16Here, in an abuse of notation, the subscripts I and P refer to consumers claiming to be impatient and
patient respectively.8
constraints C2
I(α1) ≥ 0 and C2
P(α1) ≥ 0 never bind.
For the mechanism to be feasible, all remaining resources must be distributed in period
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P(α1) | Equation (2) holds for all α1 }.
We analyze bank behavior in each of the two ﬁnancial systems: (I) In the separated ﬁ-
nancial system, consumers place a fraction (1 − γ) o ft h e i rw e a l t hi nt e c h n o l o g yA,w h o s e
return cannot be touched by the bank. In terms of resource constraint (2), this is equivalent
to imposing the additional constraints: c2
P(α1) ≥ 0 and, more importantly, c2
I(α1) ≥ 0.C o m -
bined with incentive compatibility, these additional constraints give rise to overinvestment
in technology B and the possibility of bank runs. (II) In the uniﬁed ﬁnancial system,t h e
bank is able to invest in both technologies. This allows the bank a great deal of ﬂexibility to
smooth consumption and prevent runs. For example, when ¯ α consumers arrive in period 1
(the worst case scenario), the bank can liquidate all of its technology B holdings, but diﬀer-
entially reward consumers from technology A in period 2. Consumers who arrive in period 1
might receive less than (1−γ)RAy in period 2, while consumers who wait might receive more
than (1 − γ)RAy. In terms of resource constraint (2) this is equivalent to allowing c2
P(α1),
or, more importantly, c2
I(α1),t ob en e g a t i v e .
The uniﬁed system can be interpreted in several ways. The most straightforward inter-
pretation is that the bank is allowed to hold technology A assets (stocks or mutual funds)
as part of its portfolio. Another interpretation is that the bank can write subordinated
debt contracts with ﬁrms investing in technology A, whereby the bank receives period-2
consumption in the event that suﬃciently many consumers arrive in period 1.17
17We ignore potential moral hazard problems on the part of the bankers. One can imagine, though, that9
We next deﬁne “bank run” in the post-deposit game.
Deﬁnition 2.1: Consider either a uniﬁed ﬁnancial system or a separated ﬁnancial sys-
tem, and a contract m ∈ M.T h e nt h epost-deposit game is said to have a run equilibrium
if there is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which all consumers arrive in period 1 and a positive
measure of patient consumers withdraw in period 1.
Our deﬁnition of run equilibrium requires all patient consumers to choose period 1. It
is not required that all withdraw. The bank might very well oﬀer zero consumption after ¯ α
of the consumers have made withdrawals (and a hence run is known to be in progress). We
require a positive measure of patient consumers to withdraw, to rule out the degenerate case
in which patient consumers arrive in period 1 with the intention of refusing all oﬀers, since
this is equivalent to waiting until period 2.
3T h e U n i ﬁed System
In this section, we describe the planner’s problem, the solution to which yields the so-
called “optimal contract” for the uniﬁed system. The “optimal contract” attains the full-
information optimal outcome in equilibrium. Although, strictly speaking, the post-deposit
game has a run equilibrium at the “optimal contract,” the run equilibrium can be eliminated
at negligible welfare cost.18 On the other hand, we demonstrate below that the “optimal
contract” entails a positive probability of (non-run) rationing of consumers in period 1.
We restrict attention to environments in which it is beneﬁcial to provide for consumption
opportunities whenever the resources are available. It is then desirable that the impatient
bankers have a stronger incentive to cheat or undertake improper investments in the uniﬁed system. See
Calomiris and Kahn (1991) for an explicit analysis of moral hazard issues and embezzlement in banking.
18The run equilibrium is also eliminated by assuming that a patient depositor will choose not to run when
indiﬀerent between running and not running. When we introduce sunspots and the propensity to run in
section 5, it will follow that the probability of a bank run, at the optimal contract to the full pre-deposit
game, is zero.10
consumers choose period 1 and the patient consumers choose period 2 for making their
urgent withdrawals. Also, impatient consumers unable to withdraw in period 1 and patient
consumers should take advantage of their consumption opportunities in period 2.19 Since
the amount of a withdrawal in period 1 greater than one unit would be stored for period 2,
there is no reason for the bank to provide more than one unit in period 1; hence we have
yγ ≤ ¯ α. Thus we can restrict the search to contracts in which we have
c
1(z)=1 for z ≤ γy. (3)
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[(1 − α + γy)¯ u +( α − γy)β¯ u +( 1− α)u((1 − γ)yRA + c
2
P(α) − 1) (4)
+( α − γy)u((1 − γ)yRA + c
2
P(α) − 1) + γyu((1 − γ)yRA + c
2
I(α)] f(α)dα.
Maximand (4) captures the fact that impatient consumers who are rationed in period 1
cannot be prevented from receiving the (higher) consumption that the patient consumers
receive in period 2. The only incentive compatibility constraint to worry about is that a
patient consumer must be better oﬀ waiting until period 2 than accepting one unit in period
















I(α)+( 1− γ)yRA)+( 1− γy/α)u(c
2
P(α)+( 1− γ)yRA − 1)fP(α)dα. (5)
19These conditions will be met if βu is large, relative to the marginal utility u0 of “left-over” consumption.11
Resource constraint (2) can be simpliﬁed to yield
α1c2
I(α1)+( 1− α1)c2
P(α1)=( γy − α1)RB if α1 ≤ γy
γyc2
I(α1)+( 1− γy)c2
P(α1)=0 if α1 >γ y .
(6)






subject to 5 and 6. (7)
The next theorem establishes that the “optimal contract” necessarily rations consumers
in period 1 when the fraction of impatient consumers arriving in period 1 is suﬃciently large,
i.e. when α1 is close to ¯ α,e q u a lt o¯ α,o rg r e a t e rt h a n¯ α. The intuition for this result is that,
if consumers were never rationed (no matter the realization of α)i np e r i o d1 ,t h e ns o c i e t y
through over-caution would be over-investing in the liquid technology, B.20
Theorem 3.1: The “optimal contract” in the uniﬁed system satisﬁes γy < ¯ α. The “ﬁrst”
γy to arrive are fully served by the bank in period 1. No other depositors are served in period
1.
Proof: Given γ,t h ef u n c t i o n s{c2
I(α1),c 2
P(α1)} that maximize W subject only to resource





P(α1) − 1 for all α1 ≤ ¯ α. (8)
However, the allocation deﬁned by (6) and (8) also satisﬁes the incentive compatibility
constraint (5), and therefore solves the more tightly constrained problem, (7). Plugging (6)
and (8) into the expression for W,a n dd i ﬀerentiating with respect to γ,w eh a v e
20This is similar to design of simpler non-ﬁnancial economic institutions. If, for example, the price of













P(α) − 1+( y − ¯ α)RA]f(α)dα < 0.
Clearly, any contract for which we have γy > ¯ α is inferior to the one characterized by (6)
and (8), since the former provides fewer resources available in period 2, with no compensating
advantage in terms of consumption smoothing in period 2 or provision of consumption in
period 1. ¤
The proof of Theorem (3.1) shows that the “optimal contract” oﬀers complete consump-
tion smoothing, according to (6) and (8). Since the patient consumers receive the same
consumption, whether they arrive in period 1 or period 2, it is obviously incentive compati-
ble. One advantage of the “payments” aspect of our model is that the “optimal contract” has
a simple, realistic solution in which there is full, but not partial, suspension of convertibility.
In the next example, we specify the following basic parameters: the utility function u(·)
for “left-over” consumption, the utility ¯ u from satisfying the urgent opportunity, the interest
factor on the illiquid asset RA, the discount factor β for delayed consumption opportunities,
and the density function f(α) for the proportion who are impatient.
Example 3.2:
y =1 0 ,u (c)=1 0 0l o g ( c) − 249, ¯ u =2 0 ,R A =1 .1,β=0 .7,




2 for α ∈ [0,0.5]
0 otherwise.
(9)
For the uniﬁed ﬁnancial system, we compute γ, the proportion of wealth invested in tech-
nology B and the ex-ante welfare of consumers W for diﬀerent values of the interest factor13
RB on the liquid technology. Our results are summarized in Table 1.21 An increase in
RB increases welfare, due to the higher yield on technology B investments, and increases
γ, because reducing the probability of rationing consumers in period 1 is now less costly,
because the gap between the yields in technologies A and B has been reduced. The opti-
mal γ is less than 0.05, which follows from Theorem (3.1) and the parameter speciﬁcation,
¯ α/y =0 .5/10 = 0.05. T h ef a c tt h a tγ is close to 0.05 indicates that the probability of ra-
tioning is small at the optimal contract. The intuition is that, at the margin, the loss of
(1 − β)¯ u multiplied by the probability of rationing is traded oﬀ against the diﬀerence in
yields, RA − RB. Whenever the consumption opportunity is important relative to RA −RB
rationing will be unlikely.
γ W
RB =1 .05 0.04544 0.8942
RB =1 .08 0.04807 0.9599
Table 1: The Liquidity Proportion γ and Welfare W in the Uniﬁed System
4 The Separated System
In order to evaluate the impact of portfolio restrictions on banks, we assume that the bank
cannot gain access to the funds invested in technology A. A comparison of the separated
system with the uniﬁed system might indicate how costly these restrictions would be. As
in Section 3, we restrict attention to environments in which it is optimal to provide one
unit of consumption to consumers arriving in period 1, whenever technology B assets are
21Computations were made using Maple version 5 running on Windows 98. The code is available from the
authors for the purposes of replicating the results.14
available.22 Since second-period withdrawals from the bank must come from technology B
investments that were not harvested in period 1, the separated system is quite diﬀerent
from the uniﬁed system. When α is high enough, some impatient consumers are rationed
in the uniﬁed system, yet full consumption smoothing is optimal. When α is high in the
separated system, it may be impossible to provide those arriving in period 2 with one unit of
consumption from technology B investments at the optimal γ, so full consumption smoothing
might be impossible. Excessive investment in technology B might be necessary in order to
satisfy incentive compatibility, so the “optimal contract” may require γy > ¯ α.F i n a l l y ,t h e
“optimal contract” might be subject to bank runs, which can only be avoided at signiﬁcant
welfare cost.
In the separated system, ex-ante welfare, the incentive compatibility constraint, and the
resource constraint are as given in expressions (4), (5), and (6). The restriction that the
bank cannot gain access to investments of technology A is expressed simply as follows:
c
2
I(α1) ≥ 0 and c
2
P(α1) ≥ 0 for all α1. (10)
Notice that constraints (6) and (10) imply c2
I(α1)=c2
P(α1)=0for α1 >γ y .I f a l l o f t h e
technology B investments are liquidated in period 1, then withdrawals from the bank must
be zero in period 2. The so-called “optimal contract” under the separated system is the






subject to (5), (6), and (10).
22That is, c1(z)=1holds for z ≤ ¯ α. Not wanting to hoard technology B assets is a stronger assumption
in the separated system than in the uniﬁed system. We will see that incentive compatibility binds in the
separated system, and refusing to liquidate technology B assets allows the bank to reduce its technology
B overinvestment while still satisfying incentive compatibility. However, if we were to rewrite the expres-
sions in problem (11) to allow for the possibility of hoarding technology B assets, Theorem (4.2) and the
overinvestment component of Theorem (4.3) continue to hold. Details are available from the authors.15
In the uniﬁed system, all of the technology B investments are harvested and some con-
s u m e r sa r er a t i o n e di np e r i o d1w h e nα is suﬃciently high. In the separated system when
α is close to ¯ α, it is typically the case that not all technology B investments are harvested
and no one is rationed. The intuition is that more investment in technology B is needed in
order to satisfy incentive compatibility without using technology A resources. While some
technology B investments may remain for patient consumers in state ¯ α, the next lemma
establishes that in state ¯ α the consumers who choose period 1 withdraw more than those
who choose period 2. Denote the solution to (11) by m∗ = {γ∗,(c2
I(α1))∗,(c2
P(α1))∗}.
Lemma 4.1: The “optimal contract” in the separated system, which solves problem
(11), satisﬁes (c2
P(¯ α))∗ < 1.
Proof: Suppose instead that (c2
P(¯ α))∗ > 1 holds. Since resources remain in period 2, it
follows that ¯ α ≤ γ∗y holds. Therefore, it is possible to increase welfare by reducing γ and
achieving full consumption-smoothing, (c2
P(α1))∗ =1+( c2
I(α1))∗ for all α1.I ti se a s yt os e e
that incentive compatibility and nonnegativity are satisﬁed, contradicting the fact that m∗
solves (11).
Now suppose that (c2
P(¯ α))∗ =1holds. We must have (c2
I(¯ α))∗ =0 , or else (just as in the
previous case) we can increase welfare by reducing γ, while maintaining full consumption-







∗ ≥ 1 (12)
for almost all α1. Otherwise, for a positive-measure set of realizations of α1, c2
P(α1) can be
increased and c2
I(α1) can be reduced to satisfy the resource and nonnegativity constraints,
which increases welfare and relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint. If inequality (12)
is strict for a positive-measure set of realizations of α1, then welfare can be feasibly increased16
by choosing (c2
P(α1))∗ and (c2
I(α1))∗ to satisfy full consumption-smoothing (where (12) holds







∗ =1 . (13)
Treating γ as a parameter, and solving the equations (6) and (13) for consumptions, we can
deﬁn ew e l f a r ea saf u n c t i o no fγ, W(γ).B e c a u s em∗ solves (11), W(γ) must be maximized









∗y − α)RB + α − 1]f(α)dα < 0.
It follows that reducing γ improves welfare, contradicting the fact that γ∗ is part of the
“optimal contract,” m∗. ¤
The intuition behind Lemma (4.1) is that too much is invested in technology B if patient
consumers arriving in period 2 receive at least 1 unit of consumption in state ¯ α. Reducing
γ does not lead to rationing, and yields a higher return on investment. The only reason to
save any consumption at all for period 2 in state ¯ α is to satisfy non-negativity and incentive
compatibility constraints. Since these constraints are not binding if (c2
P(¯ α))∗ ≥ 1 holds, too
m u c hh a sb e e ni n v e s t e di nt e c h n o l o g yB. Applying Lemma (4.1), we next show that the
“optimal contract” in the separated system always admits a run equilibrium.
Theorem 4.2: The “optimal contract” in the separated ﬁnancial system has a run
equilibrium.
Proof: We know that the “optimal contract” satisﬁes c1(z)=1for all z ≤ ¯ α .S i n c ew e
are considering the possibility of bank runs here, a patient consumer’s decision to arrive in
p e r i o d1m u s ta l s ot a k ei n t oa c c o u n tc1(z) for all z>¯ α .L e tz∗ be the smallest value of z,
g r e a t e rt h a no re q u a lt o¯ α, such that the following inequality holds17
c
1(z) ≤





If there is no value of z satisfying (14), deﬁne z∗ to equal 1. From Lemma (4.1), we know
that (c2
P(¯ α))∗ < 1 holds at the “optimal contract.” We must also have (c2
I(¯ α))∗ =0 ,o re l s e
higher welfare can be achieved by transferring consumption from those who arrived in period
1 to those who did not, while continuing to satisfy the constraints.23 It follows that, setting
z =¯ α, the left side of (14) is equal to unity, and the right side of (14) is equal to (c2
P(¯ α))∗.
Since inequality (14) is not satisﬁed, we have z∗ > ¯ α.
We claim that there is a run equilibrium, in which all consumers arrive in period 1. Those
for whom zj <z ∗ holds accept c1(zj), and those for whom zj ≥ z∗ holds refuse c1(zj) and do
not withdraw in period 1.
Without loss of generality, we can assume (c2
I(α1))∗ =0for α1 > ¯ α , because giving
period-2 consumption to those who withdraw in period 1 only increases the incentive to run.



















w h i c hi sn e g a t i v ef o rα1 <z ∗, since inequality (14) does not hold. Thus (c2
P(α1))∗ is decreas-
ing in α1 for α1 <z ∗.
Given the acceptance/refusal behavior speciﬁed above, everyone will refuse c1(z∗),s o
we have α1 = z∗ with probability 1. By (14) and (15), it is a best response for consumer
23Remember, the “optimal contract” is the one that provides the highest welfare in the equilibrium in
which the patient consumers wait until period 2.18
j to refuse if zj = z∗,a n dzj >z ∗ is irrelevant. If zj <z ∗ holds, (14) and (15) imply
c1(zj) > (c2
P(zj))∗ > (c2
P(z∗))∗, where the last inequality follows from the fact that (c2
P(α1))∗
is continuous and decreasing in α1 for α1 <z ∗. Therefore, it is a best response for consumer
j to accept c1(zj). ¤
There is an intuitive explanation for why run equilibria always exist in the separated
system. In the “optimal contract” for the separated ﬁnancial system, (c2
P(¯ α))∗ must be
less than 1, or else too much is invested in technology B. Therefore, in the event of a run,
consumers arriving in period 2 receive less than one unit. Consumers arriving in period 1 are
better oﬀ, since they receive 1 unit of consumption if zj ≤ ¯ α, and they can refuse to withdraw
and delay their arrival until period 2 otherwise. The proof is a bit more intricate, since we
must rule out the possibility that a fraction greater than ¯ α of the consumers withdraw
in period 1, possibly leaving more than one unit of consumption per capita in period 2.
Another perspective is that the desire to economize on technology B i n v e s t m e n t sc a u s e st h e
incentive compatibility constraint to bind, so that a patient consumer is indiﬀerent between
period 1 arrival and period 2 arrival, assuming other patient consumers wait. If instead the
other patient consumers arrive in period 1, those who wait are worse oﬀ, so that incentive
compatibility is no longer satisﬁed.
The following theorem provides a (seemingly weak) suﬃcient condition for the optimal
liquid asset investment under the separated ﬁnancial system to be greater than it is under
the uniﬁed ﬁnancial system and for the absense of non-run rationing of impatient consumers
of the restricted bank.
Theorem 4.3 (Overinvestment in the Liquid Asset): If ¯ α<1/RB holds, then the
“optimal contract” for the separated ﬁnancial system does not ration consumers in period 1
outside a run, and invests more in technology B than the “optimal contract” for the uniﬁed
ﬁnancial system.19
Proof: From Theorem (3.1), the “optimal contract” in the uniﬁed system satisﬁes
γ<¯ α/y. In the separated system, the “optimal contract” must invest at least enough
in technology B to provide 1 unit of consumption in period 2 when everyone is patient.
That is, we must have (c2
P(0))∗ ≥ 1, or else all patient consumers will choose period 1.
Thus, the optimal fraction invested in technology B for the separated system, γ∗,s a t i s ﬁes
γ∗ ≥ 1/(RBy).S i n c e RB¯ α<1 holds, we draw the following conclusions. First, γ∗>¯ α/y
holds, so consumers are not rationed in period 1 unless there is a run. Second, γ∗ exceeds
the optimal fraction invested in technology B for the uniﬁed system. ¤
This overinvestment in the liquid asset, B, is likely to be substantial, as long as the
maximum fraction of impatient consumers is relatively small. For example, if we have ¯ α =
0.5,y=1 0 ,a n dRB =1 .08,t h e ni nt h eu n i ﬁed system, the fraction of resources invested in
technology B is less than 0.05, as a consequence of Theorem (3.1). In the separated system,
the fraction of resources invested in technology B is more than 0.09, as consequence of the
fact that (c2
P(0))∗ ≥ 1 must hold, which implies γ∗ ≥ 1/(RBy). Notice that this lower bound
on overinvestment (at least 80% more than under the uniﬁed system) applies to all utility
functions consistent with our maintained assumptions.
Next we compute the “optimal contract” in the separated system, for the parameters of
Example (3.2).
Example 4.4: Consider the parameter values speciﬁed in Example (3.2). We also specify
RB =1 .08.
It can be shown that the “optimal contract” satisﬁes (c2
I(α1))∗ =0for all α1.T h e i n -
tuition is that giving consumption to impatient consumers in period 2 hurts incentive com-
patibility and forces more overinvestment in technology B, outweighing any consumption-20








Finding the “optimal contract” now reduces to ﬁnding the value of γ that maximizes welfare
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint. The optimal γ will cause the incentive
compatibility constraint to hold with equality, yielding: γ∗ =0 .09445 and W∗ =0 .8688.
Now compare the “optimal contract” in the uniﬁed system to the “optimal contract” in
the separated system, for parameters given by (9) and RB =1 .08. Welfare is clearly higher in
the uniﬁed system, because problem (12) involves maximizing over a strictly smaller set than
problem (7), due to the additional non-negativity constraints. Technology B investment in
the separated system is nearly double that in the uniﬁed system.
Several conclusions can be drawn from our example. Eﬃciency can be enhanced by
eliminating legal restrictions on bank portfolios, such as the restrictions imposed by the
weak form of narrow banking. Moreover, our analysis suggests that in this case eliminating
regulatory and other government restrictions would cause a major shift from liquid, lower-
yield investments to illiquid, higher-yield investments. This shift would necessitate occasional
scarcities of liquidity (in the model, non-run rationing of period 1 consumption). Allowing
banks to freely invest in all technologies eliminates bank runs triggered by extrinsic shocks,
but it introduces the possibility of planned “running out” of bank cash due to intrinsic
shocks.25
24This result is derived by ﬁrst obtaining a lower bound for the multiplier on the incentive compatibil-
ity constraint, which allows us to obtain a lower bound for the multiplier on each state-α non-negativity
constraint. Since these multipliers are positive, the constraints must bind, so the impatient receive no con-
sumption from the bank in period 2. If the parameters of the example are changed, it is possible that some
of the non-negativity constraints do not bind. Also, it can be shown that the bank cannot do better by
refusing to liquidate some technology B assets. (Details are available from the authors.)
25Our analysis does not include deposit insurance or model moral hazard issues for bank management, nor
does it include credit chains (or other systemic problems) as analyzed by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).21
5 Sunspots and the Propensity to Run
Run equilibria in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) are not really equilibria, because consumers
would not deposit their funds if they knew that a run would take place.26 Diamond and
Dybvig suggest that a run could take place in equilibrium with positive probability, triggered
by some extrinsic random variable “sunspots,” as long as the probability of the run is suﬃ-
ciently small. We calculate here what the “suﬃciently small” probability is for an example of
a bank in the separated ﬁnancial system. The optimal contract (without quotation marks)
now considers the probability that a run will take place. Cooper and Ross (1998) formalize
this notion, in a model that restricts contracts to a particularly simple class. Peck and Shell
(2003) perform a similar analysis to that presented here. Since the “optimal contract” in the
separated ﬁnancial system always has a run equilibrium (Theorem 4.2), while equilibrium
bank runs are considerably rarer in Peck and Shell (2003), it is worthwhile to perform the
corresponding calculations here.
The pre-deposit game is characterized as follows. At the beginning of period 0, the bank
announces a deposit contract, m ∈ M. Then consumers, before observing their type, decide
whether to deposit. At the beginning of period 1, each consumer learns her type and observes
a sunspot variable, s, distributed uniformly on [0,1].27 Sunspots do not aﬀect preferences
(including the likelihood of being impatient), endowments, or technology. Next, consumers
decide whether to arrive in period 1 or period 2, and the game proceeds as before. Note that
the period in which a consumer arrives can depend on the realization of the sunspot variable
s as well as the realization of her type. The space of mechanisms is unchanged; the solution
concept is Bayes-Nash equilibrium. We have a run equilibrium if, for some set of realizations
of s occurring with positive probability, all consumers arrive at the bank in period 1 and a
26See Postlewaite and Vives (1987).
27The uniformity assumption is without loss of generality.22
positive measure of the patient consumers withdraw in period 1.
Suppose that the economy has a “propensity” to run, in the following sense: whenever
we have s<s 0, then all consumers choose to arrive at the bank in period 1, and accept con-
sumption oﬀers of at least one unit, whenever such a run is consistent with equilibrium, and
patient depositors are strictly better oﬀ running than not running in the run equilibrium.28
If a run is not consistent with equilibrium, then all patient consumers wait.29 When we have
s ≥ s0, the equilibrium is selected in which all patient consumers wait for the second period.
Of course, incentive compatibility must be satisﬁed. We will calculate the cutoﬀ value of s0
below which the optimal contract in the separated system has a run equilibrium. We work
in the context of our example, deﬁned by the parameters in (9), and RB =1 .08.
There are two approaches to eliminating runs within the separated ﬁnancial system. One
approach, which turns out to be the best here, is to continue to provide 1 unit of consumption
in period 1,30 and increase γ to the point at which c2
P(0.5) = 1. From (16), we can calculate
the optimal γ to avoid runs, γ∗∗ =0 .09630. It is now feasible and welfare-maximizing to
oﬀer full consumption smoothing, as in (13). Welfare in this contract that eliminates runs is
Wnorun =0 .8651. The other approach to eliminating runs is to ration consumers in period
1, thereby retaining enough consumption to guarantee that c2
P(0.5) = 1.T h i s a p p r o a c h i s
too costly here. However, if we change the density function, f, so that high realizations of
α are suﬃciently unlikely, then the best way to avoid runs might be to make the impatient
consumers suﬀer in the extremely unlikely event of large α.
28We impose the condition that the run equilibrium is only selected if patient depositors strictly prefer
to run when all other patient depositors run. Otherwise, the bank’s optimization problem would have no
solution for some propensities to run.
29We restrict attention to contracts for which there is an equilibrium in which all patient consumers wait.
See Ennis and Keister (2003) for an analysis of more general equilibrium- selection mechanisms. For example,
as in Ennis and Keister, the propensity to run could depend on the strength of the incentive to run provided
by the bank’s contract, which in turn would inﬂuence the selection of the optimal contract.
30That is, c1(z)=1for z ≤ ¯ α,a n dc1(z)=0for z>¯ α.23
We now determine the optimal contract that has a run equilibrium, given that a run
occurs with probability s0 and that the equilibrium in which patient consumers wait occurs
with probability (1−s0). Patient consumers must be induced to wait when s ≥ s0, and there
is no attempt to provide incentives when s<s 0, so the incentive compatibility constraint is
unchanged. It can be shown that the incentive compatibility constraint binds, so investment
in technology B is unchanged, γ = γ∗ =0 .09445. In other words, the probability of a run has
no eﬀect whatsoever on the optimal contract, as long as the probability is small enough so
that the optimal contract tolerates runs. When we have s<s 0, there is no reason to punish
consumers for running. It turns out that everyone will receive 1 unit of consumption in period
1, until the bank runs out. The gain from providing for the consumption opportunities of a
signiﬁcant minority of impatient consumers outweighs the foregone yield of RB.T h u s ,t h e
probability of receiving 1 unit in period 1 is γy, which equals 0.09445, so the proportion
of consumers taking advantage of their undiscounted consumption opportunity in state α is
(1−α+αγy). Conditional on a run taking place, welfare is Wrun =0 .1978. Overall welfare
is a weighted average of Wrun a n dt h ew e l f a r ew h e nar u nd o e sn o tt a k ep l a c e ,W∗ =0 .8688.
Thus, the cutoﬀ value of s0 solves
s0W
run +( 1− s0)W
∗ = W
norun. (17)
From (17), we calculate the cutoﬀ value of s0 to be 0.005521. If the propensity to run is
less than 0.5521%, then it is better to tolerate the unlikely event of a run than to increase
technology B investment to prevent runs. In other words, the cost of eliminating this fragility
from the ﬁnancial system is too high, in terms of eﬃciency when the system is working
smoothly.31 On the other hand, if the propensity to run is greater than 0.5521%,t h e n
the bank will not tolerate runs. In this case, the equilibrium allocation diﬀers from any
31See the papers by Lagunoﬀ and Schreft (1998) and Allen and Gale (1998) for an analysis of ﬁnancial
crises based on local interactions. Our notion of fragility is distinct from theirs, yet not altogether unrelated.24
equilibrium allocation of the the so-called “optimal contract” in the post-deposit game.
6 Concluding Remarks
We believe that the indivisibility in our model that is associated with the transactions and
payments for urgent “consumption opportunities” is very well-motivated in terms of the
payments function of banks. The indivisibility assumption also simpliﬁes the analysis. It
facilitates calculation of the optimal contract. We conjecture, however, that the indivisibil-
ity assumption is not crucial for our basic results. For the discussion below, we drop the
indivisibility assumption – supposing instead that the impatient consumers have smooth
utility functions over period-1 and period-2 consumption, and the patient consumers have
smooth utility functions over period-2 consumption.
Under the uniﬁed system, all of the technology B investments will have to be liquidated
in state ¯ α, or else higher welfare can be achieved by investing more in technology A, without
aﬀecting the consumption of the impatient. In the special case of deterministic α,t e c h -
nology B investments will be used exclusively for impatient consumers and will be fully
liquidated. When α is random, rather than rationing the impatient consumers, the optimal
contract will likely have period-1 consumption tapering oﬀ as more consumers arrive, ex-
hibiting the “partial suspension of convertibility” obtained by Wallace (1988, 1990), Green
and Lin (2003), and Peck and Shell (2003). A reasonable conjecture would be that run
equilibria are impossible under the optimal contract.
Under the separated system, the typical case will be overinvestment in technology B.
For example, if α is deterministic, then the uniﬁed system harvests all of the technology B
investments in period 1, leaving nothing for the patient consumers.32 To satisfy incentive
32As in our setup, the patient consumers are compensated by a bigger share of the technology A investments
in the uniﬁed system. Notice that it is diﬃcult even to talk about the separated system without the impatient
caring about future consumption. If the impatient were ﬁnished with consumption in period 1, what would
happen to their investments in technology A?25
compatibility, the optimal contract in the separated system will invest more in technology
B and/or reduce consumption in period 1. When α is random, but not too volatile, we
anticipate the same conclusion.
We conjecture that run equilibria are possible at the optimal contract in the separated
system. Our basic intuition remains: Investment in technology B must satisfy incentive
compatibility for each patient consumer, based on the other patient consumers waiting. A
patient consumer is indiﬀerent between choosing to arrive at the bank during period 1 and
choosing to arrive during period 2, weighing all possible values of α.S t a t e¯ α is likely to be
one of the states in which a patient consumer is better oﬀ choosing period 1, because this is
the state in which the most investments are harvested in period 1 and the fewest remain for
period 2. If so, then there is a run equilibrium.
What are the diﬀerences between our model and the closely related narrow banking
model of Neil Wallace (1996)? Wallace’s technologies are slightly diﬀerent from ours, allow-
ing some liquidation value of technology A in period 1, and having technology B’s return
between period 0 and 1 equal the return between period 1 and 2. These diﬀerences are
probably not crucial. Wallace’s utility functions do not exhibit any indivisibilities (such as
our urgent consumption opportunities), but they are otherwise more general than ours. We
have argued that the indivisibility is probably not crucial for most of our basic results. The
extra structure we impose on utility functions allows us to maintain tractability while gen-
eralizing Wallace (1996) in other directions. In particular, we allow α to be stochastic and
only impose the condition that the distribution be continuous, while Wallace requires α to
be deterministic. We believe that the introduction of stochastic aggregate fundamentals, in
our case the random α, dramatically changes the problem.
Wallace’s working deﬁnition of narrow banking is that all of the bank’s obligations to
depositors must be met for every possible pattern of withdrawals. This amounts to a re-
striction that the space of contracts is limited to a menu of consumption bundles that is26
independent of the history of withdrawals. On the other hand, Wallace’s banks are permit-
ted to invest in both technologies. Wallace shows that, without subordinated debt contracts,
any allocation achievable with narrow banking is also achievable with autarky, so that nar-
row banking eliminates the role for banks. On the other hand, our notion of the separated
ﬁnancial system is closer to the description of narrow banking in the introduction to Wallace
(1996), where banks are (only) restricted to holding liquid (short-term) assets. We allow
deposit contracts to specify withdrawals that are fully contingent on the history, but restrict
the banks’ portfolios to technology B assets. Because our portfolio restrictions are diﬀerent
from Wallace’s restrictions on the banking contract, banks play a very important role in our
separated ﬁnancial system.
In our model, as in Wallace (1996), the banking restrictions under consideration cannot
improve welfare and can cause harm. Removing the restrictions will improve welfare. We ﬁnd
that the optimal contract in the separated ﬁnancial system tends to exhibit overinvestment in
the liquid technology. In our model, there is always a bank run equilibrium in the separated
ﬁnancial system, but bank runs will occur with probability zero in the uniﬁed ﬁnancial
system.33 This is in contrast to the widespread view that narrow-banking-type restrictions
provide stability.
The main intrinsic uncertainty in our formal model comes from the urgent transaction
opportunities of consumers. We expect quite similar results in the case where there is also
uncertainty about the investment returns, RA and RB.
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